Dette er hvad bureaukraterne i EU pønser på i deres Euro-Arabiske Dialog, som de her sørger for at kalde Euro-Mediterranean, vi skulle jo nødigt høre ordet ‘araber for mange gange.
Uddragene stammer fra en EuroMeSCo rapport fra februar 2003, og er et led i Barcelonaprocessen, som sikkert ikke mange har hørt om.
Læs hvordan araberne er bange for Øst-Central-Europas medlemsskab af EU og at dette ‘irriterer’ dem, nu gik det lige så godt med milliard-tilskud og million-immigration.
Læs at nogle hundrede tusinde immigranter fra Øst-Europa er bekymrende, mens et tal på måske 20 millioner muslimer ikke er – nej vi kan forvente 20-30 års yderligere Tyrkisk immigration til EU.
Og at NÅR Tyrkiet kommer med i EU, bliver grænsen mod Mellem-Østen nærmest umulig at kontrollere.
EuroMeSCo er ‘Euro-Mediterranean Study Comission’
“In fact, the South Mediterranean countries have developed an irritating tendency to see the Eastern Enlargement of the Union as a new source of threat to trade, investment, European aid and even to migration.
As far as the most problematic aspect of Enlargement is concerned – that of the free movement of people – a comparison of demographic developments inside the European Union, together with the analysis of past experience of migration flows and of the prospects of labour market development, all make it clear that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will not be serious competitors to Mediterranean Arab countries which will continue to be the main sources of migrant inflows for the next two-to-three decades, for two key reasons:
· The destruction of the Berlin Wall did not result in a human flood from the East to the West, as some had feared.
This gives grounds to believe that Enlargement will not overturn tendencies already established. Commentators seem to agree that annual flows will be of the order of 350,000 in the initial years after membership is completed and that this figure should then progressively fall.
Growth perspectives in Central and Eastern Europe, major investment inflows, together with the gradual reduction of differentials in income and living standards, as well as demographic structures should combine in limiting migration flows from these countries.
· The situation in the Mediterranean is diametrically opposed to that in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the population age pyramid, the uncertain outlook for unemployment – particularly for graduates – as well as the slow pace of political reform will be powerful drivers for emigration.”
In view of the expected demographic evolution inside the European Union, two conclusions emerge: ·
If the decline in birth rates persists at current levels, the European Union will lose at least 25 million persons by 2025; ·
There will be a reduction in the active proportion of the total population. In 2025 it is estimated that 14 active workers will have to support the needs of 10 independent persons. These conclusions have led some experts to recommend the introduction of replacement migration to counter the growth in economically inactive persons and rejuvenate the active population, thus protecting pension levels.
It is not our purpose here to discuss whether such propositions are well-founded or not, but one consequence seems inescapable; no matter what barriers are introduced, inward migration will continue into the European Union in the years ahead.
The question is, therefore, whether it will come essentially from Central and Eastern Europe or from other peripheral zones, particularly the South-East Mediterranean.
We propose that, even if there were to be immigration from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, estimated at an annual rate of 350,000 after Enlargement has taken place, the principle sources of immigration into the European Union for the next two or three decades will be primarily provided by Turkey, a candidate member, the countries to the east of Central and Eastern Europe, which are not candidates, and, above all, the Mediterranean Arab countries.
In effect, by expanding its borders up to the boundaries with Ukraine, Byelorussia and Russia, the European Union will have to confront significant illegal migrant flows from these countries.
All the conditions for this will have been established: for example; porous frontiers, increased zones of contact, the lure of the new members of the Union, the development of mafias and networks organising illegal migration, income differentials and political and social instability.
With the entry of Turkey into the Union, still a distant but real possibility by 2015, the migration challenge will take on an unexpected urgency, for it will mean that, not only will the Union have to be prepared to welcome million of new internal Turkish migrants but it will thereafter have common frontiers with a significant number of Neat and Middle Eastern countries: Syria, Iraq, Iran and the republics of the Caucasus. It goes without saying that it will be extremely difficult to lock the gates of Europe; it does not work today and will be far harder to do tomorrow!
It is, of course, possible to argue that this will be countered by the convergence expected after Turkish entry and the consequent induced reduction in push and pull effects.
However, given Turkey’s size, with a population in 2015 of almost 80 million inhabitants, and the current divergences in salary, income and employment, particularly in agriculture, convergence will take decades to be achieved.
There will therefore be a prolonged period during which Turks, taking advantage of existing networks and open borders, will continue to immigrate into the enlarged European Union, unless long-term discriminatory measures are applied to Turkey – something which the Turkish government will not accept.
Thus the main competitors with Arab Mediterranean countries, particularly in the Maghrib, will not be the countries of Central and Eastern Europe but countries to their east and, particularly, Turkey, once it has joined the Union.
In fact, it would be more appropriate to talk of complementarity, rather than competition in that the focus will be primarily on regions of geographic proximity, particularly Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian countries as the destinations of migrants from the East, whereas migrants from the Mediterranean will go mainly to European Mediterranean countries, particularly France, Spain and Portugal. In this scenario, Italy appears to be the most exposed for it is at the junction of the East and the South. Geography will thus be a decisive factor in the selection of host countries.”